Current Issues with Regards the Defences of Provocation and Self-Defence in the Criminal Law Context by Yule, Jennifer
Yule, Jennifer M. (2007) Current Issues with Regards to the Defences of Provocation 
and Self-Defence in the Criminal Law Context. In Proceedings Australasian Law 
Teachers Association, Perth, Australia. 
Copyright 2007 (please consult author) 
 
Australasian Law Teachers Association 
2007 Conference Paper 
 
CURRENT ISSUES WITH REGARDS THE DEFENCES OF 
PROVOCATION AND SELF-DEFENCE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
CONTEXT 
 
Jennifer Yule∗ 
                                                 
∗ Associate Lecturer, Queensland University of Technology 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In early July 2007 a case involving a 30 year old man who had killed his girlfriend 
made the headlines in the Brisbane newspapers.1 According to the accused, he had 
hit the 16 year old girl because she had taunted him with her infidelity. At trial he 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter but successfully used provocation as a defence to the 
murder charge. The victim’s mother expressed outrage at the result and felt that her 
daughter had been on trial and that she had been portrayed as a vixen. As a result of 
the publicity this case received, there have been renewed calls for a review of the 
defence of provocation in Queensland. By the end of July 2007, the Queensland 
Attorney-General announced that the inquiry already being undertaken in respect of 
the excuse of accident (which had also been brought about as a result of public 
pressure from press reports of controversial cases where two men had been acquitted 
of legal responsibility for two deaths during street fights2) would include an audit of 
the defence of provocation.3 A discussion paper was released on 12 October 2007.4 
 
 
This is similar to what has happened in other jurisdictions. There was a public outcry 
in Victoria in 2004 after a man successfully used the defence of provocation after 
killing his former wife who told him that sex with him repulsed her.5 More than 3000 
letters were sent to the government in protest and consequently an inquiry was held 
by the Victorian Law Reform Commission and in 2005 Victoria abolished the 
defence of provocation. After an outcry when a man used provocation as a defence to 
killing a male friend who got into bed with him and touched him,6 New South Wales 
is currently reviewing its laws. 
 
 
In a similar way, cases where self-defence is used can also generate publicity. These 
controversial cases often involve allegations of gender or cultural bias. There are also 
issues when battered woman’s syndrome is used.7 Is self-defence appropriate in 
those circumstances and if so what evidence should be used?8 
 
 
 
The public’s perception of a verdict as undesirable comes in part from how the media 
portrays results in cases before the courts. Politicians sometimes respond by referring 
                                                 
1 Leanne Edmistone, ‘Verdicts provoke debate’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 3 July 2007, 1.  
2 Ibid. 
3 CCH, ‘Qld: Provocation defence to be audited’ < http://www.cch.com.au/fe_news> at 19 July 2007. 
4 Queensland Government, Discussion Paper - Audit on Defences to Homicide: Accident and 
Provocation ,  October 2007. 
5 R v Ramage [2004] VSC 508. 
6 Green v The Queen  (1997) 191 CLR 334. 
7 R Bradfield, ‘Understanding the Battered Woman Who Kills her Violent Partner – The Admissibility 
of Expert Evidence of Domestic Violence in Australia’ (2002) 9 Psychiatry, Psychology and the Law 
177, 178. 
8 Ibid. 
the matter to an inquiry and/or reforming the law. How much influence does the 
press have over law reform?9 As Cohen argues: 
 
There is the public perception of the seriousness of the crime problem (crime 
is increasingly ranked a more important social problem than unemployment, 
health care, nuclear risk, environmental damage…And…there is the 
rhetorical manipulation of the crime problem and public anxiety in media and 
political discourse.10 
 
The public only know, to a large extent, what they read in newspapers or hear and 
see on the radio or television. Should law be reformed because the public demands it, 
or should law makers make their own agenda and a long term plan with criteria for 
determining which laws should be targeted for reform?11 There can also be an issue 
with the influence lobby groups can have on the law reform process, for example, 
fathers’ rights groups and family law reform.12 In 2004 the United Kingdom Law 
Commission considered the role public opinion should play in law reform when 
considering how to use the results of a public opinion survey: 
 
Public opinion should not necessarily decide what the law should be, for 
public opinion may not be carefully thought out and the law may itself help to 
shape public opinion, but it should be properly taken into account.13  
 
 
This paper will argue that the law in relation to murder and the complete defence of 
self-defence and the partial defence of provocation is influenced by what the public 
and the lawmakers consider to be the appropriate position with regards the balance 
between punishing the behaviour and acknowledging excuses. That is, in what 
circumstances is taking another human being’s life acceptable or excusable, or in 
what circumstances can it not be allowed. Also the law determines what gender, 
cultural and sexual orientation factors are to be taken into account in that 
consideration.  
 
 
Provocation and self-defence will be considered in this paper as case studies of the 
role public outrage plays in promoting law reform and change. The defences will be 
illustrative of how the tension between public expectations about justice and fairness 
and perceptions about the role of gender and culture on the one hand, and the formal 
process of law reform to reflect societal evolution on the other hand are resolved. It 
will be seen that even where there has been public outcry and pressure, the response 
                                                 
9 See for example Stanley Cohen ‘Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference’ (1996) 47 The British 
Journal of Sociology 1, 8; Reg Graycar and Jenny Morgan ‘Law Reform: What’s in it for Women?’ 
(2005) 23 Windsor YB Access Just 393, 415; Robert Keiter ‘Public lands and law reform: putting 
theory, policy, and practice in perspective’ (2005) 4 Utah Law Review 1127, 1211; Barry Feld 
‘Violent youth and public policy: a case study of juvenile justice law reform’ (1995) 79 Minnesota 
Law Review  965, 982. 
10 Stanley Cohen ‘Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference’ (1996) 47 The British Journal of Sociology 
1, 8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 R Graycar ‘Law Reform by Frozen Chook: Family Law Reform for the New Millennium’ (2000) 24 
Melb U L Rev 737, 746. 
13 Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder Final Report (2004) at [3.146]. 
has not been knee-jerk but rather to refer matters to law reform commissions for a 
considered response.14 However it does show that there is a lack of proactive review 
of cases and that public pressure compels issues being put on the agenda rather than 
academic and professional priority. 
 
PROVOCATION 
 
Provocation is a defence which reduces the offence of murder to manslaughter. Even 
though there may be an intent to kill it can be deemed that, in some circumstances, it 
is not appropriate to be classified as murder. It is not saying the killing is justified or 
excused. What it is saying is that in the circumstances, the response (which resulted 
in the killing) is within the normal range of behaviour of what can be expected of the 
ordinary person and that it represents an acknowledgment of human frailty. This is 
the traditional view of the law.15 The origins of the defence of provocation lie in 
seeking to mitigate the punishment and to alleviate the harshness of the penalty of 
the offence of murder. When the penalty for murder was death, often provocation 
was a way of reducing the punishment from the death penalty to life imprisonment. 
In jurisdictions where there was a mandatory life sentence, there was also an 
argument for this defence to be in existence. All the jurisdictions considered in this 
paper have abolished the death penalty and some have removed the mandatory life 
sentence. In Australia, there is a mandatory life sentence for murder in the 
jurisdictions of Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern 
Territory. 
 
 
For there to be provocation the acts or words of the victim must: 
 
1. be done or said by the deceased to or in the presence of the killer; 
2. have caused in the killer a sudden and temporary loss of self-control; and 
3. be of such character as might cause an ordinary person to lose self-
control.16 
 
 
There are two aspects to the third element, the objective test, being: 
 
a.  the gravity of the provocation; and 
b. whether the provocation was of such gravity that it could cause an 
ordinary person to lose self-control and act like the accused.17 
 
 
When considering whether there has been a loss of self-control it has been said that: 
 
Traditionally the onset of sudden passion involving loss of self-control 
characteristic of provocation has been associated with acts or actions which 
provoke the accused to uncontrollable anger or resentment…a notion that 
                                                 
14 See for example Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, New Zealand. 
15 Mirko Bagaric and Kenneth Arenson, Criminal Laws in Australia (2nd ed, 2007), 134. 
16 R v R (1981) 28 SASR 321, 322. 
17 Stingel v R  (1990) 171 CLR 312, 325-7. 
may be traced back as far as Aristotle…These days, however, judicial 
discussion of the doctrine places emphasis on the accused’s sudden and 
temporary loss of self-control, without necessarily attributing that loss of self-
control to anger or resentment, except in so far as it is asserted that the act 
which causes death was done as a result of passion or, as it is colourfully 
expressed, ‘in the heat of passion’.18  
 
 
With regards to the objective test, referred to above, there are two limbs. The first 
limb involves assessing the gravity of the provocation. The accused’s characteristics 
can be taken into account in this consideration. Might an ordinary person in the same 
circumstances be provoked? The High Court has held: 
 
Conduct which might be insulting or hurtful to one person, might be 
extremely so to another because of that person’s age, sex, race, ethnicity, 
physical features, personal attributes, personal relationships or past history. 
The provocation must be put into context and it is only by having regards to 
the attributes or characteristics of the accused that this can be done.19  
 
Secondly, it is questioned whether an ordinary person might have lost self-control to 
the same extent as the accused. The only characteristic that can be taken into account 
in Australia is the accused’s age.20 
 
 
Whether the accused has lost self-control is a subjective test. However whether an 
ordinary person would have acted in a similar way is an objective test. It has been 
argued21 that it is difficult for a jury to switch from a subjective to an objective test 
and that this requires ‘mental gymnastics’ which may result in the wrong verdict 
being reached. It is also problematic when deciding what should be taken into 
account in the objective test. Should that include gender, religion, culture, sexual 
orientation, illness or addictions?  The ordinary person for the purposes of the 
objective test in the defence of provocation is not the same as the reasonable person 
for the purposes of the law of negligence.22 The ordinary person needs to have 
reasonable powers of self control.23 Characteristics such as age, sex, race, physical 
features, personal attributes, personal relationships and past history may be relevant 
to assessing the seriousness of the provocation or the gravity of a wrongful act or 
insult.24 However the personal characteristics of the accused do not affect the extent 
of the power of self control of the ordinary person. An exception to that is the age of 
the accused.25 The High Court has held that the attributes or characteristics of the 
accused must be assessed to consider the gravity of the conduct.26 
 
                                                 
18 Van Den Hoek  (1986) 161 CLR 158, 166-7. 
19 Masciantonio v R (1995) 129 ALR 575, 581. 
20 Stingel v R (1990) 171 CLR 312. 
21 Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘Moral blameworthiness- The “objective test” dilemma’ (2003) 24 
Australian Bar Review 173. 
22 R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312, 328. 
23 Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601, 613. 
24 R v Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312, 326. 
25 R v Stingel  (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 327. 
26 Masciantonio v R  (1995) 183 CLR 58. 
 
The element of suddenness has been held to not require that the killing immediately 
follow the provocative act.27 This is particularly relevant when considering cases 
involving battered woman’s syndrome. The High Court has considered this.28 It is 
possible for the loss of self control to come after a long period of abuse and without 
any particular incident.29 
 
 
The retaliation must have some reasonable relationship to the provocation.30 The 
High Court has held that the degree of retaliation is just one of the matters to be 
taken into consideration when considering whether or not there has been a loss of 
self control by the accused.31 
 
 
There are problems with the defence of provocation. The test involves a subjective 
element, with regards the gravity of the provocation, and an objective element. There 
is an issue with what can be taken into account when deciding whether an ordinary 
person would lose control and kill. Should gender, culture or religion be taken into 
account? As the High Court has said:32 
 
No doubt there are classes or groups within the community whose average 
powers of self-control may be higher or lower than the community average. 
Indeed it may be that the average power of self-control of the members of one 
sex is higher or lower than the average power of self-control of members of 
the other sex. The principle of equality before the law requires, however, that 
the differences between different classes or groups be reflected only in the 
limits within which a particular level of self-control can be characterized as 
ordinary. The lowest level of self-control which falls within those limits or 
that range is required of all members of the community. 
 
 
Is there something wrong with the general idea that an ordinary person can lose 
control and kill another human being? All human beings are capable of self-control 
and in a liberal democratic society the rights of the individual are important and self-
control is encouraged. However not everyone exercises self-control.33 If we allow 
loss of self-control to be an excuse, will that encourage people to frame their 
justification to fit within the excuse? Dalrymple suggests the more rage is a 
diagnosis, the more rage there will be.34 It can be argued that the idea of the loss of 
self-control is a fallacy: 
 
Angry impulses do not so overwhelm us to the point that we become enslaved 
by them. We are endowed with a high level of choice concerning how we act, 
                                                 
27 R v Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1. 
28 Osland v R  (1998) 197 CLR 316. 
29 R v Secretary (1996) 107 NTR 1. 
30 Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1. 
31 Johnson v R  (1977) 136 CLR 619. 
32 Stingel v R (1990) 171 CLR 312, 329. 
33 Graeme Coss ‘The Defence of Provocation: An Acrimonious Divorce from Reality’ (2007) 18 
Current Issues Crim Just 51, 52. 
34 T Dalrymple, ‘Rages of the Age’ (2002) 2/54 National Review 22. 
even in relation to the most provocative forms of conduct. Those who lash 
out when confronted with a distasteful experience do not respond in this 
manner because of an absence of a meaningful choice. They do so because 
they elect to do so35 
 
 
Consider for example that far more women are killed by their partners than kill their 
partners.36 There is also a ‘growing tendency to blame others for one’s own failures 
and unwillingness to accept responsibility for one’s own insufficiencies’.37 In an old 
case from the nineteenth century, there was a view expressed that ‘the emotions 
released as a result of provocation were like an “unruly horse” whose rider - reason - 
might lose control after such provocation’.38  
 
 
There has been a move in tort law in recent years, with the introduction of civil 
liability legislation,39 towards personal responsibility and away from blaming others. 
This has been done by limiting the circumstances of recovery and quantum of 
damages when civil remedies are sought. Should this principle also apply in criminal 
law? There has also been a recent trend in criminal law towards a more punitive 
system.40 
 
 
Many cases involve the factual paradigm where a woman leaves a man for another 
man and the former partner kills the woman and claims he was provoked by her 
actions. If you consider the divorce rate throughout the jurisdictions, can it be said 
that an ordinary person could lose control and kill because their former partner has 
commenced another relationship? If this were so, then there would surely be far more 
murders than there actually are. Is it also about the power relationship? Is it also 
about men regarding women as their property? There are some cases where the 
accused has used the fact that the victim has told them of their new sexual partners as 
provocative conduct.41 Infidelity within a relationship should not be a defence for 
murder. Victims should not be blamed especially considering they are not able to tell 
their side of the story.  
 
 
                                                 
35 L Neal and M Bagaric ‘Provocation: The Ongoing Subservience of Principle to Tradition’ (2003) 
67 Journal of Criminal Law 237, 247. 
36 Reg Graycar and Jenny Morgan ‘Law Reform: What’s in it for Women?’ (2005) 23 Windsor YB 
Access Just 393, 401. 
37 T Dalrymple, ‘Rages of the Age’ (2002) 2/54 National Review 22, 23. 
38 R v Hayward (1833) 6 C&P 157, 159, 172 ER 1188, 1189 (Tindal CJ) cited in S Yannoulidis, 
‘Excusing Fleeting Mental States: Provocation, Involuntariness and Normative Practice’ (2005) 12(1) 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 23, 32. 
39 For example see Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).    
40 Stanley Cohen ‘Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference’ (1996) 47 The British Journal of Sociology 
1, 8; Richard Harding ‘Victimization, Moral Panics, and the Distortion of Criminal Justice Policy’ 
(1994) 6 Current Issues Crim Just 27, 28 and Sandra Egger ‘Victimisation, Moral Panics and the 
Distortion of Criminal Justice Policy: A Reply to Richard Harding’ (1994) 6 Current Issues Crim Just 
43. 
41 Leanne Edmistone, ‘Verdicts provoke debate’, The Courier Mail (Brisbane), 3 July 2007, 1. 
Jurisdictions which have abolished the mandatory life sentence for murder have been 
more willing to abolish the defence of provocation.42 However there is less support 
for abolishing the defence of provocation in jurisdictions which still have a 
mandatory life sentence for murder. If the defence of provocation is not to be 
abolished, should it be framed differently? Rather than asking whether the accused 
lost self-control, ask ‘what were the features of the accused’s rage, or fear, reaction 
that caused their judgment to be overwhelmed with such devastating 
consequences’.43 Brookbanks argues, ‘the defence should be recast, not as a 
concession to human frailty, but as a statutory recognition of the disabling effects of 
uncontrolled rage of the particular individual’.44 Without scientific evidence given 
by experts establishing a causal connection between the disorder and the behaviour, 
loss of self-control becomes no more than an abuse excuse.45 
 
Model Criminal Code 
 
The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General established in 1990 the Model 
Criminal Code Officers Committee to develop a Model Criminal Code with the aim 
of pursuing uniformity in the different jurisdictions with regards criminal law. 
 
 
In was recommended in the 1998 Model Criminal Code that the defence of 
provocation be abolished. The Model Criminal Code Officers Committee found there 
was not only gender bias in the defence but also that:46 
 
The real issue in deciding whether the partial defence of provocation should 
be retained is one of culpability - whether the defendant should be culpable 
for murder, or for the lesser crime of manslaughter. 
 
 
It was concluded that it was more appropriate to deal with differences in culpability 
in sentencing rather than by using the defence of provocation which of course 
assumes the sentence can be varied. 
 
Queensland 
 
In Queensland provocation is a partial defence to murder47 and a complete defence to 
assault.48 There is still a mandatory life sentence for murder in Queensland. The 
defence of provocation has been used successfully to reduce murder to manslaughter 
                                                 
42 For example, Tasmania and Victoria. 
43 W Brookbanks, ‘I lost it- rage and other excuses’ (2006) 31(4) Alt LJ 186, 192. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid 191. 
46 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model 
Criminal Code- Discussion Paper-Chapter 5-Fatal Offences Against the Person, June 1998, 103.  
47 Criminal Code (Qld) s 304. 
48 Criminal Code (Qld) s 269. 
in some recent cases which have caused public concern. The defence has been 
referred to an inquiry (which had been set up to review the excuse of accident) for an 
audit.49 A discussion paper was released on 12 October 2007.50 The paper considers 
accident and provocation and looks at law reform in other jurisdictions like other 
Australian states and the United Kingdom and New Zealand. It also considers the 
role of the jury and the nature of the sentencing system in Queensland. It involved an 
audit of trials for murder and manslaughter between 2002 and 2007. There were 80 
murder and 20 manslaughter trials selected. In some cases it is hard to know when 
there were multiple defences and issues which one swayed the jury because jury 
deliberations are confidential. So the audit team based their conclusions on the 
directions given to the jury. The paper asks whether the current law reflects the 
community’s expectations of criminal responsibility. The current law was inherited 
from the English common law where ‘provocation historically arose to express 
tolerance for human frailty, at a time when men bore arms and retaliated to affronts 
to their honour’.51 The application of provocation to modern cases illustrates that its 
relevance is questionable.52 
 
Tasmania 
 
The first Australian State to abolish the defence of provocation was Tasmania in 
2003.53  The Attorney General’s reasons for removing the defence included that:54  
 
• where there is an intention to kill it should not be called something else 
just because the accused lost their self control; 
• the death penalty and mandatory life imprisonment had already been 
abolished (which was also pointed out by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions in the 2000-01 Annual Report); 
• it was subject to abuse by becoming increasingly subjective; and 
• the defence was unjust and gender-biased.  
 
The Attorney General did not consider it necessary to send the issue to the Law 
Reform Commission but did note that other jurisdictions, like Victoria, were doing 
so.55 This fact is relevant to the issue of how the law reform process operates and is 
interesting when considering what has happened in other jurisdictions. This 
illustrates a lack of a process of proactive review of laws. It was noted that conduct 
which in the past would have been relevant to provocation would continue to be 
relevant but only in relation to sentencing.56 
                                                 
49CCH, News Headlines: Qld: Provocation defence to be audited 
<http://www.cch.com.au/fe_news.asp?e=1&document_id=91649&topic_code=7&category_code=0>  
at 19 July 2007. 
50 Queensland Government, Discussion Paper - Audit on Defences to Homicide: Accident and 
Provocation, October 2007. 
51 Graeme Coss ‘The Defence of Provocation: An Acrimonious Divorce from Reality’ (2007) 18 
Current Issues Crim Just 51, 52. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas). 
54Hansard, House of Assembly (Tas), Thursday 20 March 2003 Pt 2, 30-108, 
<http://www.hansard.parliament.tas.gov.au>. 
55 Ibid. 
56R Bradfield, ‘The Demise of Provocation in Tasmania’ (2003) 27 Crim LJ 322, 323. 
Victoria 
 
Victoria abolished the defence of provocation in 2005. A review of the defence of 
provocation had been called after a case in 2004 which caused public outrage. In R v 
Ramage57 the defence of provocation was successfully used by a man who bashed 
and strangled his estranged wife. The accused claimed to have lost self-control when 
the victim said to him that sex with him repulsed her. 
 
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission in its final report, Defences to Homicide, 
identified a number of criticisms of the defence of provocation, including: 
 
• provocation and a loss of self-control is an inappropriate basis for a partial 
defence - people should be able to control their impulses, even when angry; 
• provocation is gender biased; 
• provocation promotes a culture of blaming the victim; 
• the test for provocation is conceptually confused, complex and difficult for juries 
to understand and apply; 
• provocation is an anachronism – it is no longer necessary since abolishing 
mandatory sentence for murder.58 
 
New South Wales 
 
New South Wales is currently reviewing the defence of provocation. The New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission recommended in 1997 that the defence should be 
retained but reformulated. That review had been in response to the case of Green v 
The Queen59, where the High Court upheld an appeal (3:2) from a conviction of 
murder. The accused was originally sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for murder 
but received 10.5 years for manslaughter at the second trial after the appeal. The 
provocation in that case was being touched by a same sex friend who had got into 
bed with him. 
 
 
It was recommended that the defence of provocation should be available if the jury 
found that ‘the accused, taking into account all of his or her characteristics and 
circumstances, should be excused for having so far lost self-control as to have 
formed an intent to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm…as to warrant the 
reduction from murder to manslaughter’.60 The recommended reformulation of 
provocation ‘represents an attempt to retain a subjective element, while taking 
community standards into account, without reference to an ordinary person 
standard’.61 This would be similar to the test used by the House of Lords in Smith.62 
                                                 
57 [2004] VSC 508. 
58 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report, October 2004, 26. 
59 (1997) 191 CLR 334. 
60 NSW Law Reform Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Provocation and Infanticide, Report 
83, October 1997, 76. 
61 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report, October 2004, 47. 
62 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146. 
New Zealand 
 
There have been cases in New Zealand where the defence of provocation has been 
successfully used which have caused public concern. For example, in R v Nepia63 the 
provocation was the statement made by the estranged wife that the husband would 
not be seeing the children again. There has also been the use of Intermittent 
Explosive Disorder64 as a factor in causing the loss of self-control in which 
‘typically, they blame the victim’.65 
 
 
The New Zealand Law Commission recommended in 2001 that the defence of 
provocation be abolished.66 The Commission considered that ‘the defence diverges 
from modern values in some significant respects’.67 In 2002 the mandatory life 
imprisonment for murder was replaced with a discretionary sentence. There is a 
presumption of life imprisonment unless it can be proven there are circumstances 
that would make it manifestly unjust.68 
 
 
The government referred the defence of provocation to the Commission again in 
2004. However despite the matter being referred to the NZLC twice, the defence of 
provocation still exists despite academic support for its abolition. Tolmie argues that 
the defence of provocation should not be abolished in New Zealand but rather: 
 
The defence should be unavailable in circumstances where the act of the 
victim is provocative because it challenges the power and control that the 
offender believes he is justified in exercising over another person. This 
includes behaviours that women, as independent and autonomous actors, are 
entitled to do, such as leaving their relationship with the offender, partnering 
or re-partnering, making access arrangements in relation to their children, or 
reporting acts of violence against them to the police.69 
 
 
On 26 October 2007 the NZLC report was tabled in Parliament and it recommended 
repealing provocation.70 The commission looked at murder cases in Auckland and 
Wellington from 2001 to 2005. The government will now consider the report. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
                                                 
63 [1983] NZLR 754 (CA). 
64 Murray v R CA 391/96, 27 February 1997. 
65 Brookbanks, above n 14, 191. 
66 New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered 
Defendants (R73:2001), 42. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Sentencing Act  2002 (NZ) s102. 
69 J Tolmie, ‘Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish 
Provocation’ [2005] NZ Law Review 25, 45. 
70 New Zealand Law Commission, The Partial Defence of Provocation, October 2007. 
The defence of provocation has been under scrutiny in the United Kingdom over the 
last few years. The House of Lords in 2000 in R v Smith71 stated that when 
considering whether an ordinary person would have lost self control it was relevant 
to take into account the personal characteristics of the accused as well as age and sex. 
Lord Hoffman held: 
 
The general principle is that the same standards of behaviour are expected of 
everyone, regardless of their individual psychological make-up. In most 
cases, nothing more will need to be said. But the jury should in an appropriate 
case be told, in whatever language will best convey the distinction, that this is 
a principle and not a rigid rule. It may sometimes have to yield to a more 
important principle, which is to do justice in the particular case. So the jury 
may think that there was some characteristic of the accused, whether 
temporary or permanent, which affected the degree of control which society 
could reasonably have expected of him and which it would be unjust not to 
take into account. If the jury take this view, they are at liberty to give effect to 
it.72 
 
In 2005 the Privy Council in Attorney General for Jersey v Holley73 decided not to 
follow the House of Lords and held that only the accused’s age and sex should be 
taken into account in the ordinary person test. Lord Nicholls held: 
 
Taking into account the age and sex of a defendant … is not an exception to 
this uniform approach. The powers of self-control possessed by ordinary 
people vary according to their age, and, more doubtfully, their sex. These 
features are to be contrasted with abnormalities, that is, features not found in 
a person having ordinary powers of self-control. The former are relevant 
when identifying and applying the objective standard of self-control, the latter 
are not.74 
 
In R v James the Court of Appeal in 200675 decided to follow the Privy Council’s 
decision rather than the House of Lords and to only consider age and sex.  
 
 
The United Kingdom Law Commission recommended that the defence of 
provocation be reformulated suggesting:76  
 
that the partial defence of provocation should remain for those who, with out 
acting out of a considered desire for revenge: (1) killed only in response to 
gross provocation; and/or (2) killed only in response to a fear of serious 
violence in circumstances where someone of the defendant’s age and of an 
ordinary temperament might have reacted in the same or in a similar way’.77 
 
                                                 
71 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146. 
72 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 173. 
73 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580. 
74 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580, [13]. 
75 R v James [2006] 1 All ER 759. 
76 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? 
(2005), 187. 
77 Ibid 171. 
This recommendation would result (among other things) in the accused’s sex not 
being taken into consideration in the objective test.78 
 
Another consideration is the mandatory penalty for murder. The United Kingdom 
still has a mandatory life sentence for murder. It has been argued79 that it is more 
difficult for a jurisdiction with a mandatory penalty to abolish the defence of 
provocation than for one that does not. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Provocation has recently been the subject of reviews and amendments. Tasmania and 
Victoria have abolished provocation as recommended in the Model Criminal Code. 
New South Wales, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom are all in the 
process of reviewing it. Queensland has conducted an audit of cases where 
provocation has been used as a defence. Only jurisdictions without a mandatory life 
sentence for murder have abolished provocation. 
 
SELF-DEFENCE 
 
Self-defence is a complete defence to murder. The successful use of this excuse 
results in a complete acquittal. It is also a defence to other offences that require the 
use or threat of force as an element. There is a subjective element (what the accused 
believed at the time of the killing) as well as an objective element (whether the belief 
was based on reasonable grounds). Cases have interpreted the elements which 
constitute self-defence.80 There has been criticism of the defence in that it has been 
interpreted and applied in a way which is gender biased against women.81 Self-
defence has traditionally been associated with a one-off spontaneous encounter such 
as the pub brawl scenario between two men of relatively equal strength.82 However 
this interpretation has been developed over time by the courts.83 
 
 
Self-defence was defined by the common law as being established if the defendant 
believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do what was done: 
 
The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused 
believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do 
what he [or she] did. If he [or she] had that belief and there were reasonable 
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grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then 
he [or she] is entitled to an acquittal.84 
 
In all the Australian jurisdictions, self-defence is now regulated by statute.85 New 
South Wales, Victoria, ACT, the Northern Territory and the Commonwealth have all 
adopted the Model Criminal Code provision with regards self-defence.86 
 
 
There are a number of problems with women trying to argue self-defence. One is that 
usually women have to wait until their partner is asleep or is not expecting an attack 
which impacts on the immediacy of the threat. Another is the proportionality of their 
response to the threat. Thirdly there is a problem with the necessity of their response 
in contrast to other possibilities like just leaving the relationship or asking for help. 
These problems have the potential to influence the jury’s assessment of what the 
accused believed and whether the belief was based on reasonable grounds.87      
 
 
If the accused is able to satisfy the subjective element of the defence but not the 
objective element, some jurisdictions recognise what is termed excessive self-
defence. That is, in circumstances where the court finds that the accused was entitled 
to use some force in self-defence but used an excessive amount of force that resulted 
in the death of the attacker, murder will be reduced to manslaughter.88  The doctrine 
of excessive self-defence was rejected by the Privy Council,89 accepted by the High 
Court90 and then rejected by the High Court.91 Therefore, currently at common law, 
and in the Code states,92 there is no excessive self-defence. However some common 
law jurisdictions have reintroduced excessive self-defence.93 
 
Model Criminal Code 
 
In was recommended in the 1998 Model Criminal Code that excessive self-defence 
not be reintroduced.94  
 
It was also recommended that the test for whether a person has acted in self-defence 
should be whether the accused’s conduct has been reasonable rather than the 
accused’s belief. 
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Therefore a person who believed he or she was in danger, even if mistaken 
about that perception, would be able to rely on self-defence, unless his or her 
conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she 
perceived them. The reasonableness of the belief is only relevant as a matter 
to be taken into account by the jury in considering whether the belief was in 
fact honestly held.95 
Queensland 
 
In Queensland the Criminal Code has provisions for the defending of unprovoked 
assaults96 and for defending provoked assaults97 as well as defending others.98 
Traditionally these provisions have been interpreted by the courts to reflect a male 
bias in the sense of two men of relatively equal strength or the ‘pub brawl’ 
situation.99 
 
 
There are subjective and objective parts to the defence. The accused must believe 
that they cannot otherwise protect themselves (which is subjective) but this belief 
must be based on reasonable grounds (which is objective). Some women have been 
able to use self-defence and have no problem establishing the subjective element but 
have problems proving the objective part. This is because often the woman waits 
until the man is asleep or is not expecting an attack, which does not fit within a belief 
that they cannot reasonably protect themselves.100 As Bradfield states: 
 
The importance placed by the courts on the existence of an imminent threat 
(limiting both what is necessary and what is reasonable) has most 
significantly restricted the availability of the defence of self-defence to 
women who kill their abusive partners after a prolonged period of violence. In 
non-confrontational situations and in the absence of an identifiable threat (ie I 
will kill you when you wake up), the courts have had great difficulty 
accepting the appropriateness of self-defence.101 
 
New South Wales 
 
The defence of self-defence was codified in New South Wales in 2001,102 based on 
the Model Criminal Code. However excessive self-defence was also reintroduced.103 
The successful defence reduces murder to manslaughter. 
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Victoria 
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended codifying self-defence to 
clarify that: 
 
• a person may be acting in self-defence when he or she believes the harm 
threatened by the deceased is inevitable, although not immediate; and 
• a person’s response need not be proportionate to the harm threatened to 
successfully establish they acted in self-defence, so long as it is reasonable in the 
circumstances.104 
 
The Commission also considered whether a new defence should be introduced with 
regards women who kill abusive partners. However, it was recommended that instead 
of introducing a new defence the existing self-defence should be reformed to better 
work for women.105 This was supported by the Women’s Legal Service Victoria who 
were concerned that creating a new defence would medicalise women’s behaviour.106 
 
 
Victoria reintroduced excessive self-defence in 2005,107 and also modified self-
defence.108 A new section was also introduced, providing that where family violence 
is involved a person may have reasonable grounds for believing that their conduct is 
necessary to defend themselves even if responding to harm that is not immediate.109 
The section states some types of evidence which may be relevant including: 
 
• the history of the relationship,  
• the cumulative effect of the violence,   
• social, cultural or economic factors, 
• general nature of relationships which involve violence, 
• psychological effort of violence.110 
 
New Zealand 
 
The New Zealand Law Commission recommended in 2001 that the partial defence of 
excessive self-defence not be introduced.111 It also recommended against introducing 
a separate defence for battered women.112 Instead it recommended clarifying the law 
of self-defence so that it was clear that it is not always necessary that the danger be 
imminent but rather be inevitable.113  
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The Commission also recommended the sort of expert evidence that might be 
relevant and helpful where a battered defendant is using self-defence.114 This 
included expert evidence to help juries understand why women remain in abusive 
relationships, the danger from the relationship, why the defendant felt she had no 
other alternative and cultural difficulties.115 
 
Summary 
 
The Model Criminal Code and the New Zealand Law Commission both 
recommended self-defence be reformulated but recommended against reintroducing 
excessive self-defence and against introducing a separate defence for battered 
women’s syndrome. New South Wales and Victoria have reintroduced excessive 
self-defence, against the recommendation by the Model Criminal Code, and have 
modified self-defence in accordance with the recommendation by the Model 
Criminal Code. Self-defence is not currently under review in Queensland or the 
United Kingdom. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As has been illustrated by considering a number of jurisdictions in Australia and 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, there are problems with the defences of 
provocation and self-defence. Their process of reform to a large extent has been 
considered and consistent with proper public policy objectives. Most jurisdictions 
have responded to public pressure by setting up reviews, with Tasmania as the 
exception. 
 
 
Provocation should be abolished in those jurisdictions that have not already done so. 
The test used in the defence of provocation is conceptually difficult for the jury to 
understand. The jury is told they can take certain characteristics into consideration in 
one part of a test but not in another part. This has the potential for injustice. The 
objective test is biased toward the dominant culture. It is also biased towards 
heterosexual males. Factors including illness, addictions, culture, history, sexual 
orientation as well as age and sex could be taken into consideration in the sentencing 
process. There is no longer a good enough reason to show mercy. The death penalty 
has been abolished and the mandatory life sentence had been abolished in many 
jurisdictions. There is no longer a need to mitigate against the harshness of a 
mandatory sentence in those jurisdictions which have abolished it. 
 
 
Murder should be labelled murder. If there is an intention to kill someone then it 
should be named murder. Why should the loss of self-control be the basis of a 
defence? If there are mitigating factors, they can be taken into consideration in the 
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sentencing phase in those jurisdictions which have abolished the mandatory life 
sentence. Violence should not be condoned. Self-control should be encouraged. It 
should not be enough to reduce murder to manslaughter to say ‘my former partner 
slept with another person’ or ‘the victim made homosexual advances towards me’. 
Victims cannot defend themselves in court. It is usually only the word of the accused 
as to what was said and done leading up to the killing. It would seem from a review 
of cases like Ramage116 that the defence of provocation encourages blaming the 
victim for the criminal acts of the accused. Society in general would seem to support 
the concept that a person should be allowed to be promiscuous, or of a different 
sexual orientation, and not be killed for it. This statement would be supported by the 
public response to recent cases. It could be argued that it is about power and one 
person should not have power over another to control what they do or who they sleep 
with. That message needs to be consistent and clear. 
 
 
Self-defence needs to be considered and reformed. The partial defence of excessive 
self-defence should not be re-introduced. If the accused has used too much force then 
it should be classified as murder and any mitigating factors taken into account in the 
sentencing phase if there is not a mandatory sentence. Self-defence needs to be 
defined so as to include those circumstances where the threat is not imminent but still 
inevitable. If that is the case then there does not need to be a separate defence for 
battered women. Women can be accommodated by the existing law as long as it is 
clear that the threat does not need to be imminent and that evidence of family 
violence is admissible. 
 
 
Law reform should be driven by an overall perception of the public policy objectives 
and long term goals with the greater good in mind rather than by knee-jerk reactions 
to articles in the press and in response to public opinion. There seems to be a trend in 
recent times for the criminal law to be more punitive which seems to be driven by 
politicians responding to what the public desires.117 However there also seems to be a 
trend towards personal responsibility in the civil law.118 
 
 
Law and public policy can certainly be about taming the unruly horse. Jurisdictions 
should be careful about why law should be reformed. Whether provocation is 
abolished or not, whether self-defence should be reformulated or excessive self-
defence be reintroduced, should depend upon it being necessary because the current 
law is producing an unjust result, not because the law is difficult, messy, hard or 
complex to implement.  
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